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Abstract
Public sector organisations pursue multiple objectives and serve a number of stakeholders. But stake-
holders are rarely explicit about the valuations they attach to different objectives, nor are these valuations
likely to be identical. This complicates the assessment of their performance because no single set of
weights can be legitimately chosen by regulators to aggregate outputs into unidimensional composite
scores. We propose the use of dominance criteria in a multidimensional performance assessment
framework to identify best practice and poor performance under relatively weak assumptions about stake-
holders’ preferences. We estimate multivariate multilevel models to study providers of hip replacement
surgery in the English NHS with respect to their performance in terms of length of stay, readmission
rates, post-operative patient-reported health status and waiting time. We find substantial correlation
between objectives and demonstrate that ignoring the correlation can lead to incorrect assessments of
performance.
Keywords: Performance assessment, provider classification, multidimensional, multilevel modelling
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1. Introduction
Variation in healthcare quality and costs are well documented (Wennberg and Gittelsohn 1973; Keeler
1990; Busse et al. 2008; Bernal-Delgado et al. 2015) and may arise when providers enjoy discretion
over how their services are organised and provided (Arrow 1963). Regulators, who are charged with
overseeing the provision of care, are concerned about variation if it is not caused by differences in
healthcare needs or patient preferences as it may signal inequity, inefficiency or unsafe care. To address
this, many healthcare systems have implemented routine benchmarking (or ‘profiling’) of healthcare
providers to identify comparative performance levels. This might help single out ‘positive deviants’
(Bradley et al. 2009; Berwick 2008; Lawton et al. 2014), or exemplars of best practice, that can be studied
further or rewarded as part of a pay-for-performance scheme. At the other extreme, poor performers
might be subject to penalties for falling short of their peers or to interventional actions by regulators.
Healthcare providers share two important features with other public sector organisations that complicate
the assessment of their performance (Dixit 2002; Besley and Ghatak 2003; Propper and Wilson 2012).
First, they lack a single overarching objective, such as profit, against which their performance can
be assessed. Instead, they pursue multiple, sometimes conflicting, objectives and this requires the
regulator to measure and incentivise achievements along a range of performance dimensions. These
achievements are typically non-commensurate and include different aspects of performance reflecting
resource use, clinical effectiveness, and other dimensions of quality such as accessibility (Smith 2002;
Goddard and Jacobs 2009; Porter 2010; Devlin and Sussex 2011). Second, providers typically serve
several stakeholders (e.g. patients, purchasers of care, and politicians) and the values these stakeholders
attach to objectives are often not known to the regulator1, but are unlikely to be identical (Smith 2002;
Propper and Wilson 2012); see Devlin and Sussex (2011) for examples from healthcare and the wider
public sector.
The lack of a set of common, explicit valuations for individual performance dimensions makes it difficult
to construct a single, unidimensional performance measure. If valuations were known and common
across stakeholders, it would be possible to aggregate multiple performance scores into unidimensional
composite scores. Such measures are attractive as they allow a complete and transitive ranking of
providers, facilitate the presentation and dissemination of performance information to stakeholders, and
offer a simple means to adjust rewards in a pay-for-performance framework (Dowd et al. 2014). But
without such knowledge, there is no guidance on how to aggregate achievements appropriately.
The empirical literature has addressed this problem in different ways: Some studies restricted their
assessment of provider performance to those performance dimensions for which explicit valuations
have been expressed. Examples include Timbie et al. (2008), Timbie and Normand (2008) and Karnon
et al. (2013), all of which translate hospital mortality estimates into monetary units using the expressed
valuation of a statistical life. The obvious shortcoming of this approach is that performance dimensions
which lack explicit valuations (e.g. waiting times, patient satisfaction, or emergency re-admission rates2)
are necessarily omitted from the analysis. Their omission may lead to tunnel vision, whereby providers
1 One could estimate the preferences of individual stakeholders or groups thereof by means of elicitation or through the study of
revealed preferences (Ryan et al. 2001). However, this would likely be a very difficult and costly undertaking and is therefore rarely
done in practice.
2 It may be possible to translate achievements on some objectives, e.g. emergency readmissions rates or other measures of health
outcomes, into quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) by means of modelling (Timbie et al. 2009; Appleby et al. 2013; Coronini-
Cronberg et al. 2013). A monetary valuation of QALYs has been expressed in the English NHS and elsewhere. However, the data
requirements are substantial and the statistical uncertainty introduced through modelling is likely to further compound the problem
of differentiating between true performance signal and noise.
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concentrate their efforts on performance dimensions with explicit valuations at the expense of other
dimensions (Holmström and Milgrom 1991; Goddard et al. 2000).
Alternatively, analysts often either choose a set of weights, implement pre-defined scoring algorithms such
as equal weighting, or derive weights from the data using approaches based on item response theory
(Landrum et al. 2000; Landrum et al. 2003; Daniels and Normand 2006; Teixeira-Pinto and Normand
2008), data envelopment analysis (Dowd et al. 2014), and more ad-hoc econometric specifications
(Chua et al. 2010). However, such practice conflicts with one of the key tenets of economic welfare
theory, namely that the stakeholders are the only legitimate judges of their own preferences and that,
ultimately, responsibility for specifying valuations for performance dimensions should rest with the relevant
stakeholders (Smith and Street 2005). There is no guarantee that weights imposed by analysts, however
these are arrived at, match the preferences of all stakeholders. Consequently, organisations being
assessed might legitimately question the validity of the generated index.
There is an alternative way to address the problem of determining appropriate weights. Multidimensional
performance assessment circumvents the issue by analysing performance against each achievement
individually and then combining the results into an overall performance profile. In doing so, it makes
explicit how healthcare providers perform on each performance dimension and how these dimensions
correlate. The multidimensional approach has enjoyed increasing popularity in the health economic
literature: Hall and Hamilton (2004) assess the performance of surgeons in terms of 30-day mortality and
morbidity using a Bayesian hierarchical bivariate probit model. Hauck and Street (2006) use multivariate
multilevel models to study the performance of health authorities across 13 performance indicators.
Gutacker et al. (2013) study hospital performance with respect to five health dimensions and compare
their results to those based on a composite measure. Portrait et al. (2015) compare Dutch Diabetes care
groups in terms of costs and a broad range of quality indicators, whereas Häkkinen et al. (2014), Kruse
and Christensen (2013) and Street et al. (2014) study the performance of hospitals in terms of costs and
a single measure of patient health outcome for different conditions.
But multidimensional performance assessment is not a panacea for the problem of judging performance
across multiple objectives. A multidimensional performance profile does not permit ranking of hospitals or
comparison to some performance standard. Hence it remains unclear which providers excel or perform
poorly across multiple performance dimensions. This constitutes a major limitation of the multidimen-
sional approach for practical purposes, and one that we seek to overcome in this study. More specifically,
we propose the use of dominance criteria to judge hospital performance against a multidimensional
benchmark. The concept of dominance has the attractive feature that it allows comparison of multidimen-
sional performance profiles against benchmarks under relatively weak assumptions about stakeholders’
utility functions. Indeed, the only requirement is that the regulator can judge whether the marginal utility
of an achievement is positive or negative and that this qualitative judgement applies to all stakeholders.
We believe this to be a reasonable pre-requisite in most contexts.
We apply our approach to data on providers of hip replacement surgery in the English NHS during
the period April 2009 to March 2012. Performance is assessed along four risk-adjusted performance
metrics: inpatient length of stay (‘efficiency’), waiting times (‘access to care’), 28-day readmission rates
and improvements in patient-reported health status after surgery (both ‘clinical quality’). Each of these
metrics has been the focus of recent health policy in England (Department of Health 2008; Department
of Health 2012; Propper et al. 2008). We estimate multivariate multilevel models to account for the
clustering of patients in providers and exploit the correlation of provider achievements across dimensions
(Zellner 1962; Hauck and Street 2006). Empirical Bayes estimates of the provider-specific posterior
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means and variance-covariance matrices are used to classify hospitals into three categories: dominant,
dominated, and non-comparable. We quantify the uncertainty surrounding this classification in the form
of Bayesian probability statements.
The study is the first to apply dominance criteria to multidimensional performance assessment of
healthcare providers and derive appropriate confidence statements. Besides this, we make three further
contributions to the empirical literature on hospital performance. First, we provide evidence about
the correlations, and thus the potential for trade-offs, between a number of objectives that healthcare
providers typically face. Previous research has focused predominantly on the association between
hospital costs and mortality (see Hussey et al. (2013) for a review), largely ignoring other important
dimensions such as waiting times or health-related quality of life. Second, in contrast to previous studies
conducted at hospital level (e.g. Martin and Smith 2005), we focus on a single homogeneous patient
population, thereby reducing the risk of ecological fallacy. Third, by exploiting novel data on pre-operative
health status in addition to the co-morbidity markers that are usually available in administrative records,
we are better able to isolate from case-mix differences the true impact that providers have on performance
measures (‘value added’).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we set out the assessment framework
in conceptual terms. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology and section 4 describes our data.
We report results in section 5 and offer concluding comments in section 6.
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2. Multivariate performance assessment using dominance criteria
Assume that a regulator, acting on behalf of stakeholders, seeks to determine the overall performance
of a number of hospital providers. Let there be k = 1, . . . ,K performance dimensions with observed
achievement Yk. Each achievement is determined by two factors, namely factors under the control of the
provider θk and external production constraints Xk, so that
Yk = f(Xk, θk) (1)
for each provider.
The parameter θk can be interpreted as the provider’s contribution to achievement k over and above the
circumstances in which they operate. This parameter is generally not directly observable and thus forms
the target for inferences about performance. In order to isolate θk from Xk, the regulator must establish
the contribution of production constraints to observed achievement by means of comparison with other
providers, i.e. through risk-adjustment as applied in yardstick competition (Shleifer 1985).
Stakeholders derive utility from the providers’ performance on each dimension, so that U = U(θ1, . . . , θK),
which is assumed to be monotonic in θk over the range of realistic values for all k ∈ K. The regulator has
only limited knowledge about the characteristics of this utility function. This may be because there are
multiple stakeholders with heterogeneous and/or unknown preferences. More specifically, the regulator
has no information about the marginal utility ∂U/∂θk that each stakeholder derives from achievements
on each performance dimension, and hence the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) at which each
stakeholder is willing to trade off performance on one dimension against that on another, i.e. ∂θk/∂θk′ for
k 6= k
′
. However, the regulator has knowledge about the sign of ∂U/∂θk, i.e. whether achievements are
expressed positively or negatively. To simplify the exposition, we assume from now on that achievements
can be expressed so that utility increases in θk.
If only one performance dimension is assessed (K = 1) or the MRS across multiple dimensions are
known then achievements can be expressed as unidimensional (composite) scores. The regulator
can then conduct either a relative or absolute assessment of performance. The first involves ranking
the providers j ∈ J according to their adjusted (composite) achievement θj , where θj > θj′ implies
U(θj) > U(θj′ ) for j 6= j
′
. This will result in a complete and transitive ordering of providers, assuming
no ties. One can then designate a specific number of providers as performing well or poorly based on
their relative ranking, e.g. whether they fall within a given percentile of the distribution. Goldstein and
Spiegelhalter (1996) provide a discussion of the statistical challenges associated with this approach.
Alternatively, providers’ performances can be classified based on θj − θ
∗ being larger or smaller than
zero, where θ∗ denotes an absolute performance standard to which providers are compared.3 The latter
is often employed in the context of quality performance assessment, e.g. with respect to standardised
mortality after surgery (Spiegelhalter 2005; National Clinical Audit Advisory Group 2011).
When multiple performance dimensions are assessed (K ≥ 2) and the MRS are unknown, a complete
and transitive ordering of providers is no longer guaranteed and relative assessments are unfeasible. As
a result, it becomes impossible to identify providers that perform well or poorly in terms of stakeholders’
3 Note that, when no external standards are specified, performance standards are typically based on the performance of all
organisations, i.e. an internal performance standard (Shleifer 1985; National Clinical Audit Advisory Group 2011). Hence, a provider
will be considered to perform well when the observed achievement is better than a reference value derived from all providers. In
many cases, this reference value is simply the average across all providers, i.e. θ∗ = 1
J
∑
θj .
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aggregate utility. This is a well-known problem in the field of welfare economics and consumer theory
(Boadway and Bruce 1984; McGuire 2001). However, some combinations of performance levels may be
strictly preferable (dominant) or inferior (dominated) to other combinations, leading to a partial ordering
of provider. As an analogue to the Pareto dominance criteria we can formalise the following general
dominance classification rules4:
A provider either
1. dominates the comparator if θjk ≥ θj′k for all k ∈ K and θjk > θj′k for some k ∈ K, or
2. is dominated by the comparator if θjk ≤ θj′k for all k ∈ K and θjk < θj′k for some k ∈ K, or
3. is non-comparable to the comparator if θjk ≥ θj′k for some k ∈ K and θjk ≤ θj′k for the remaining
k ∈ K,
where j 6= j
′
and θj′k denotes the performance level of the comparator, which may be either another
provider or an absolute internal or external performance standard θ∗.
4 Devlin et al. (2010) propose the use of a similar classification system to compare EQ-5D health profiles over time without resorting
to making strong assumptions about patients’ preferences.
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3. Methodology
3.1. Empirical approach
The aims of the empirical analysis are to obtain estimates of providers’ performance θjk and of the
correlation of θjk across each of the K = 1, . . . , 4 performance dimensions, and to classify providers
according to the dominance classification set out in section 2. We estimate multivariate multilevel
models (MVMLMs) with achievement score Yijk observed for patients i = 1, . . . , nj who are clustered in
hospitals j = 1, . . . , J . Multilevel (i.e. random intercept) models have become a staple tool in the field
of performance assessment and allow us to i) adjust achievements for differences in case-mix across
providers, ii) decompose unexplained variation in achievement into random (within-provider) variation at
patient level and systematic (between-provider) variation at provider level, and iii) obtain more reliable
(precision-weighted or shrunken) estimates of performance (Goldstein 1997; Normand et al. 1997; Ash
et al. 2012).
The multivariate nature of the data is taken into account through correlated random terms at each level
of the hierarchy. These random terms are assumed to be drawn from multivariate normal distributions
(MVN) with unconstrained variance-covariance matrices (Zellner 1962; Hauck and Street 2006). Allowing
for correlation across achievements is beneficial for several reasons. First, we can construct multivariate
hypothesis tests of parameters of interest that take into account the correlation between dimensions and
achieve correct coverage probabilities. We discuss this in detail below. Second, we can achieve efficiency
gains and obtain more precise estimates of relevant parameters if either the components of Xijk differ
across k or non-identity link functions are employed for at least some of the regression equations (Zellner
1962; Thum 1997; Bailey and Hewson 2004). Finally, by utilising a maximum likelihood estimator, data
about achievements that are missing for any particular performance domain can be assumed missing
at random conditional on all modelled covariates and achievements (Little and Rubin 1987; Goldstein
1986).
Hospital achievements are measured using two continuous and two binary variables. In order to ascertain
the conditional normality of error terms as imposed by the MVN assumption5, we apply appropriate
transformations (e.g. logarithmic) for the continuous achievement variables and specify probit models for
the binary achievement variables. The latter can be motivated by considering each binary achievement
variable as the observed realisation of a latent truncated Gaussian variable.
The empirical model to be estimated is specified as
Y ∗ijk = αk +X
′
ijkβk + θjk + ǫijk (2)
with Y ∗ijk = f(Yijk) for k = 1, 2 and
Yijk =
{
1 if Y ∗ijk > 0
0 if Y ∗ijk ≤ 0
for k = 3, 4.
The variable Yijk denotes the observed outcome, Y
∗
ijk is the corresponding latent underlying variable,
f(.) is a transformation function chosen to normalise the conditional distribution of ǫijk, Xijk is a
5 In principle it is possible to use other multivariate distributions such as multivariate gamma. However, such models are not typically
implemented in standard statistical software packages and are therefore rarely used in practice.
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vector of explanatory variables whose components may differ across dimensions, αk is an intercept
term, θjk denotes a random effect at provider level and ǫijk denotes the random error term at patient
level. Both random terms are assumed to be MVN distributed with mean vector zero and a K × K
variance-covariance matrix, so that θjk ∼MVN(0,Σ) with
E(θjk) = 0
var(θjk) = τ
2
k
cov(θjk, θjk′ ) = ρθτkτk′
for all k 6= k
′
, and similarly ǫijk ∼MVN(0,Ω) with
E(ǫijk) = 0
var(ǫijk) = σ
2
k for k = 1, 2
var(ǫijk) = 1 for k = 3, 4
cov(ǫijk, ǫijk′ ) = ρǫσkσk′
for all k 6= k
′
. The model reduces to a set of univariate models if all off-diagonal elements of Σ and Ω are
zero, i.e. achievements are uncorrelated conditional on observed patient factors.
Estimation was performed in MLwiN 2.32 called from within Stata 13 using the runmlwin programme
(Leckie and Charlton 2013).
3.2. Classification of provider effects and multivariate hypothesis tests
We compare providers against a common absolute performance standard, here defined as the expected
performance of a (hypothetical) hospital of average performance αk, i.e. the conditional mean. We
base our assessment of provider performance on estimates of θjk, which represent the provider-
specific deviation from this benchmark. These parameters are not directly estimated in a random
effects framework but can be recovered in post-estimation using Empirical Bayes predictions techniques
(Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2009). We stack performance estimates into vector coordinates to denote
the provider’s location in the k-dimensional performance space with the origin being normalised to
zero. A provider’s dominance classification is then determined by comparing its estimated adjusted
achievements to that of the performance standard across all four dimensions simultaneously. This leads
to three possible classifications: dominant, dominated, or non-comparable.
In order to quantify the uncertainty around these possible classifications we take a Bayesian perspective
and calculate the posterior probability that a given provider truly dominates [is dominated by; non-
comparable to] the multidimensional performance standard. This involves calculating the area under the
MVN probability density function that covers each of the three possibilities, for each provider.6 Figure 1a
illustrates this for the two-dimensional case with two highly correlated bivariate normal distributed
achievements (ρ = 0.6). The centroid of the density is given by X and the ellipse shows the central 95%
of this density. The density is dissected by two lines which intersect at the benchmark. The density
covered by the areas A and B equal the probability of dominating or being dominated by the benchmark,
whereas the density covered by area C gives the probability for the non-comparable outcome. To calculate
6 Our problem is similar to that encountered in the context of cost-effectiveness analysis, where one wishes to compute the probability
that a new treatment is cost-effective for a given level of willingness to pay (Van Hout et al. 1994; Briggs and Fenn 1998; O’Hagan
et al. 2000).
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these probabilities, we follow the simulation approach of O’Hagan et al. (2000). Our simulation involves
drawing S repeated samples from the MVN posterior distribution of the provider-specific Empirical
Bayes estimates of the mean vector θj and associated variance-covariance matrix Σj . We then apply
the dominance criteria to each simulation and calculate posterior probabilities by averaging across
simulations. Formally,
Pr(dominant |J = j) =
1
S
S∑
s=1
4∏
k=1
I(θsjk > 0) (3)
Pr(dominated |J = j) =
1
S
S∑
s=1
4∏
k=1
I(θsjk < 0) (4)
and by construction
Pr(non-comparable |J = j) = 1− (Pr(dominant |J = j) + Pr(dominated |J = j)) (5)
where S is the total number of simulations (here S = 10, 000), θsjk denotes the simulated provider-effect
in simulation s, and I is an indicator function that takes the value of one if the condition is true and
zero otherwise. This approach has several advantages over a series of univariate assessments: Most
importantly, it accounts for the correlation between performance dimensions and thus achieves correct
coverage of the confidence region (Briggs and Fenn 1998). Figure 1b illustrates the difference between
probability statements if performances on both dimensions are incorrectly assumed to be independent.
The dashed line outlines the resulting ‘confidence box’, which is formed by the end points of two
independent 95% confidence intervals that are adjusted for multiple testing. Furthermore, because we
make probability statements about a single quantity of interest, the provider’s location in the k-dimensional
performance space, we avoid such issues of multiple testing.
3.3. Risk-adjustment
Perhaps the primary reason that observed achievements differ across hospitals is because they treat
different types of patients. To account for this, we develop specific risk-adjustment models for three of
the performance dimensions. Based on previous research (Gutacker et al. 2013; Street et al. 2014), we
identify a set of ‘core’ variables common to all models: patient age, gender, pre-treatment health status,
primary diagnosis (coded as osteoarthritis (ICD-10: M15-19), rheumatoid arthritis (ICD-10: M05-06), or
other), comorbidity burden, socio-economic status, and year of treatment. Other variables considered
were time with symptoms, whether the patient lived alone, whether the patient required assistance
filling in the PROM questionnaire, or whether she considered herself disabled.7 Finally, in the length of
stay model, we controlled for the healthcare resource group (HRG, the English equivalent of Diagnosis
Related Groups) to which the patient was allocated.
Preliminary modelling of potential risk-adjusters was conducted on the basis of univariate multilevel
regression models and visual inspection of LOWESS plots (for continuous variables) and box plots (for
categorical variables). A significance level of p < 0.05 was required for variables to be retained. All
continuous variables were first added linearly to the regression model and we subsequently explored
whether squared terms improved the fit of the model. As expected, our exploratory work confirmed the
importance of all core variables in explaining variation in each of the three performance dimensions.
7 We only consider information contained in the pre-operative questionnaire since the e.g. need for assistance in filling in the
post-operative questionnaire may be endogenous to the outcome of the care process.
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Figure 1: Example of area of probability density plane covered under different assumptions about the dependence of achievement scores
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Time with symptoms, assistance and living alone did not explain variation in the probability of being
re-admitted and were thus not included in the final model. Non-linear effects were found for age (all
performance dimensions) and pre-treatment health status (only length of stay and post-operative OHS).
No risk-adjustment was performed in the analysis of waiting times because providers are expected
to manage their waiting lists so as to balance high priority cases and those with less urgent need for
admission.
3.4. Endogeneity due to patient selection of healthcare provider
Patients in the English NHS have a right to choose their provider of inpatient care for most elective
procedures. This may lead to bias in the estimates of hospital performance if both the choice of hospital
and the achievements for an individual patient are driven by common underlying factors that are not
controlled for as part of Xijk. This may arise if patients self-select into hospitals based on unobserved
characteristics or providers cream-skim (Gowrisankaran and Town 1999; Geweke et al. 2003). Examples
include unobserved severity, health literacy or other factors that enter the personal health production
function and are also determinants of hospital choice.
In order to test for bias due to patient selection and to obtain correct estimates of hospital performance,
we estimate the model in (2) and perform two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) as suggested by Terza
et al. (2008). In the first stage, we estimate a multinomial choice model of hospital choice, where choice
is assumed to be determined by the straight-line distance8 from the patient’s residence to the provider,
an unobserved patient effect and random noise. Distance is commonly chosen in the literature as
an instrumental variable as it is a major driver of hospital choice and is exogenously determined, on
the reasonable assumption that patients do not choose where to live based on hospital performance
(Gowrisankaran and Town 1999). The residual from this regression captures both the unobserved patient
effect and random noise. In the second stage, we enter this residual as an additional regressor into each
of the four achievement regression models. If the coefficients on the first-stage residuals are estimated
to be statistically significantly different from zero this provides evidence of selection bias and the need for
adjustments based on 2SRI (Terza et al. 2008).
8 We also include distance2 and distance3 as well as an indicator for whether the hospital is the closest alternative. Hospitals with
less than 30 patients were removed from the choice set. The patient’s residence was approximated by the centroid of the lower
super output area (LSOA) in which the patient lives. LSOAs are designed to include approximately 1,500 inhabitants, i.e. they are
substantially smaller than US ZIP codes.
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4. Data
Our primary source of data is the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) data warehouse, which contains
detailed inpatient records for all patients receiving NHS-funded care in England. We extract information
on all patients undergoing unilateral hip replacement (identified through the primary procedure code;
see Department of Health (2008)) in the period April 2009 to March 2012.9 Patients were excluded
if they were aged 17 or younger at the time of admission, underwent revision surgery, were admitted
as emergencies or day-cases, or if information on important risk-adjustment variables was missing.
Patients were also excluded if they attended a provider that treated fewer than 30 patients in the same
financial year. We record any hospital admission occurring within 28 days after the initial admission for
hip replacement surgery. All linkage was achieved using unique patient identifiers.
For each patient, we extract information on demographics and socio-economic background, medical
characteristics and information pertaining to the admission process and the hospital stay itself. These
data are used to construct three achievement measures: i) inpatient length of stay (top-coded at the 99th
percentile), ii) emergency re-admission within 28 days of discharge for any condition (coded as 0=not
re-admitted, 1=re-admitted), and iii) waiting time, measured as the time elapsed between the surgeon’s
decision to admit and the actual admission to hospital. Waiting time is categorised into waits of no more
than 18 weeks (=0) and waits exceeding 18 weeks (=1) to mirror the contemporaneous waiting time
performance standard in the English NHS.10 We also derive the following risk-adjustment variables from
HES: age, sex, comorbidity burden as measured by individual Elixhauser comorbidity conditions recorded
in secondary diagnosis fields (Elixhauser et al. 1998), number of emergency admissions to hospital
within the last year (coded as 0=none, 1=one or more), and patients’ approximate socio-economic status
based on level of income deprivation in the patient’s neighbourhood of residence as measured by the
Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004 (Noble et al. 2006).
We link HES records to data from the national Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROM) survey. This
survey invites all patients undergoing unilateral hip replacement to report their health status before and
six months after surgery using the Oxford Hip Score (OHS) (Dawson et al. 1996).11 The OHS is a reliable
and validated measure of health status for hip replacement patients and consists of twelve questions
regarding functioning and pain. For each item, the patient is asked to respond on a five-item scale. These
items are summed up to generate an index score ranging from 0 (worst) to 48 (best). The post-operative
OHS forms the fourth achievement measure and the pre-operative OHS score is used to control for
initial health status at admission. Because we observe pre-operative health status in addition to the
co-morbidity markers that are usually available in administrative records, our estimates of performance
are more likely to indicate the true impact that providers have on performance measures (‘value added’)
rather than reflect residual case-mix differences. The PROM survey also gathered additional information
on duration of problems, and whether the patient lives alone, considered herself disabled, or required
help filling in the questionnaire. Pre-operative survey responses are collected by paper questionnaire
9 HES records activity at the level of ‘finished consultant episodes’ (FCEs) and we link consecutive episodes within the hospital
stay and across hospital transfers to form continuous inpatient spells (CIPS). A CIPS is deemed complete when the patient is
discharged from one provider and not re-admitted to another provider within 2 days.
10The current performance standard is defined in terms of proportion of patients exceeding a waiting time of 18 weeks between the
GPs referral and the admission. Unfortunately, data on the time elapsed between the GPs referral and the surgeon’s decision to
admit are not recorded in HES. Our performance estimates will therefore be overstated.
11All patients are also invited to fill in the EuroQol-5D (EQ-5D) questionnaire, a generic health-related quality of life instrument
(Brooks 1996). However, we focus on the OHS as it is better approximated by a continuous distribution and we do not seek to
make comparisons across disease areas. Furthermore, the OHS is the relevant outcome measure for the newly introduced best
practice tariff (a pay-for-performance scheme) in the English NHS that was introduced in April 2014 (Monitor and NHS England
2013). Previous comparisons have demonstrated that performance assessments based on the EQ-5D and OHS lead to similar
conclusions (Neuburger et al. 2013).
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during the last outpatient appointment or on the day of admission, whereas follow-up responses are
collected via mailed survey to the patient’s home address. Participation in the PROM survey is voluntary
for patients but mandatory for all providers of NHS-funded care. Approximately 60% of patients returned
completed pre-operative questionnaires that can be linked to HES (Gutacker et al. 2015).
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5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
The estimation sample consists of 95,955 patients treated in 252 providers during April 2009 and March
2012. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Patients are on average 67 years old, and approximately
41% of patients are male. The majority (68%) report having had problems with their hip joint for 1 to 5
years, although about 8% of patients experienced symptoms for more than 10 years and 14% reported
problems for less than 1 year. Approximately 39% of patients classify themselves as having a disability,
and 27% live alone.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Description N Mean SD
Achievement measures (Dependent variables)
Post-operative OHS 81,336 38.50 9.21
Length of stay (in days) 95,878 5.36 3.75
Waiting time > 18 weeks (1=yes, 0=no) 92,154 0.17 0.38
28-day emergency readmission (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.05 0.22
Patient characteristics (Control variables)
Patient age (in years) 95,955 67.43 11.29
Patient gender (1=male, 0=female) 95,955 0.41 0.49
Pre-operative OHS 95,955 17.66 8.28
Primary diagnosis
Osteoarthritis (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.93 0.25
Rheumatoid arthritis (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.01 0.07
Other (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.06 0.24
Number of Elixhauser comorbidities
0 95,955 0.35 0.48
1 95,955 0.29 0.45
2-3 95,955 0.26 0.44
4+ 95,955 0.10 0.31
Previously admitted as an emergency (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.08 0.28
Socio-economic status 95,955 0.12 0.09
Disability (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.39 0.49
Living alone (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.27 0.44
Assistance (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.21 0.41
Symptom duration
< 1 year 95,955 0.14 0.35
1 - 5 years 95,955 0.68 0.47
6 - 10 years 95,955 0.11 0.31
> 10 years 95,955 0.08 0.26
Healthcare Resource Group
HB12C - category 2 without CC 95,955 0.77 0.42
HB11C - category 1 without CC 95,955 0.10 0.29
HB12B - category 2 with CC 95,955 0.07 0.26
HB12A - category 2 with major CC 95,955 0.04 0.19
HB11B - category 1 with CC 95,955 0.01 0.11
other 95,955 0.02 0.12
Legend: N = Number of observations, SD = Standard deviation; OHS = Oxford Hip
Score; CC = complications or co-morbidities.
Notes: Healthcare Resource Groups refer to major hip procedures for non-trauma
patients in category 1 (HB12x) or category 2 (HB11x). Socio-economic status is
approximated by the % of neighbourhood residents claiming income benefits. This
characteristics is measured at neighbourhood level (lower super output area (LSOA)).
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Figure 2 illustrates the empirical distributions of the achievement variables on their untransformed scales.
The average post-operative OHS is 38.5 (SD=9.2) and the average length of stay is 5.4 days (SD=3.8),
with both distributions showing substantial skew. Approximately 5.2% of patients were readmitted to
hospital within 28 days of discharge, and about 17.5% of patients waited longer than 18 weeks to be
admitted to hospital. There is a substantial proportion of missing responses in terms of post-operative
OHS (15.2%) and, to lesser degrees, waiting time (4.0%) and length of stay (0.1%). Conversely,
emergency re-admission status is recorded for all patients.
5.2. Provider heterogeneity and correlation between performance dimensions
From the estimated variance-covariance matrices Σ and Ω we can calculate the correlation across
performance estimates.12 The lower off-diagonal in Table 2 shows the correlation between performance
estimates at provider level, whereas the upper off-diagonal shows the correlation at patient level. Bold
numbers indicate that the correlation coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero (p<0.05;
Huber-White standard errors).
Table 2: Correlation between performance dimensions
Performance dimension (1) (2) (3) (4)
Length of stay (1) 1.00 -0.13 0.02 0.02
Post-operative OHS (2) -0.34 1.00 -0.02 -0.07
Waiting time > 18 wks (3) 0.26 -0.31 1.00 0.00
28-day emergency readmission (4) 0.03 -0.49 0.16 1.00
Notes: Lower triangle reports the correlation between random effects at
provider level, whereas upper triangle (in italics) reports the correlation
between random effects (i.e. the idiosyncratic error term) at patient level.
Bold indicates that the correlation is statistically significantly different from
zero at the 95% level.
We focus our discussion on the correlation between performance dimensions at provider level. Our
results suggest significant correlations for four combinations of dimensions. Hospitals with shorter length
of stay also realise better post-operative health status for their patients (ρ = -0.34; SE = 0.067; p<0.001).
This is consistent with findings from randomised controlled trials that tested the effectiveness of so-called
‘fast track’ or ‘enhanced recovery’ pathways and found that hospitals that mobilise patients sooner after
surgery were able to discharge them quicker and achieve better post-operative outcomes (Husted et al.
2008; Larsen et al. 2008; Paton et al. 2014). We also find evidence to suggest that hospitals with shorter
length of stay also have a lower proportion of patients waiting more than 18 weeks to be admitted (ρ =
0.26; SE = 0.065; p<0.001), suggesting better management of capacity and of their waiting lists. This
would be consistent with a queuing model of limited bed capacity, where prospective patients cannot be
admitted until current patients are discharged. Hospitals that have better post-operative health outcomes
also tend to have a lower proportion of patients waiting for more than 18 weeks (ρ= -0.31; SE = 0.071;
p<0.001). Finally, the correlation between post-operative health status and probability of an emergency
readmission within 28 days is negative and statistically significant (ρ = -0.49; SE = 0.078; p<0.001).
Overall, these correlations indicate that inferences based on a series of univariate assessments would
likely be misleading and that our MVMLM is preferable for this empirical analysis of provider performance.
12All achievements are adjusted for case-mix. The estimated coefficients on risk-adjustment variables and associated standard errors
are not the focus of this study and are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. The first-stage residuals from the selection equation
are jointly statistically significant (χ2(4) = 14.97; p<0.01) when entered into the main equations, suggesting that self-selection into
hospital may bias performance estimates if uncontrolled for (see Table A2 in the Appendix for first-stage estimates).
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Figure 2: Empirical distribution of unadjusted achievement scores
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It is also of interest to understand howmuch of the observed variability in adjusted achievement scores can
be attributed to providers (Hauck et al. 2003). We calculate the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC)13
for each of the four performance dimensions with confidence intervals formed by the delta method. The
largest ICC is observed for waiting times with 27.4% (SE = 0.020; p<0.001) of unexplained variation in
achievements occurring between providers, followed by length of stay with approximately 13.3% (SE =
0.011; p<0.001). In contrast, the ICCs on the achievements post-operative OHS (1.7%; SE = 0.002;
p<0.001) and emergency readmission (2.2%; SE = 0.003; p<0.001) are substantially smaller; implying
that providers have less influence over these performance dimensions.
We have conducted sensitivity analyses with respect to a number of modelling choices (results are
reported in Appendix Tables A3 to A5): First, we excluded privately owned and operated providers (so
called ‘independent sector treatment centres’ (ISTCs)) as these may be argued to operate under different
production constraints (see below). The estimated covariance terms in Σ are somewhat attenuated and
the correlations of waiting time with length of stay (p=0.174) and post-operative health status (p=0.857)
are no longer statistically significant. Second, we included additional regressors based on patient risk
factors averaged at provider level to correct for potential bias arising from correlation between Xij and
the hospital random effects (Mundlak 1978).14 Due to convergence problems, we restricted this to patient
age, pre-operative PROM score and level of income deprivation. Again, covariance terms are smaller in
size but remain statistically significant. Finally, we restricted the risk-adjustment to variables that can
be derived from routine administrative data, i.e. we excluded all variables based on the PROM survey.
Results are robust to this omission.
5.3. Provider performance assessment
We now turn to the assessment of multidimensional provider performance. Figure 3 shows the location
of each provider in the four-dimensional performance space, where each panel presents scatter plots
for two dimensions. The axes for all performance dimensions except post-operative health status are
reversed (i.e. multiplied by −1) so that higher scores indicate better performance. Hence, providers in the
NE quadrant perform better than the benchmark on both dimensions, whereas those in the SW quadrant
perform worse. Providers that dominate or are dominated by the multidimensional benchmark with at
least 90% probability are highlighted as darker points.
Figure 3 shows that we identify five dominant and eight dominated providers at a probability level of 90%.
It turns out that all dominant providers are privately owned and operated treatment centres that perform
mainly orthopaedic procedures, here marked as triangles, whereas all dominated providers are public
NHS providers, marked as circles, that provide a wider mix of services, including emergency care. Note
however that not all ISTCs are located in the NE quadrant, and not all NHS providers are located in the
SW quadrant. To test whether the observed performance advantage of ISTCs also holds on average, we
re-estimated the models and included an indicator variable for private ownership. We found statistically
significant effects on length of stay (beta=-0.100; SE = 0.020; p<0.001), post-operative health status
(beta=1.205; SE = 0.157; p<0.001), probability of being readmitted (beta=-0.084; SE = 0.072; p<0.001),
and the probability of waiting longer than 18 weeks (beta=-0.820; SE = 0.030; p=0.007). Ideally one
13The ICC for performance dimension k is ICCk =
τ2
k
τ2
k
+σ2
k
.
14This bias is likely to be small. We compared coefficient estimates from fixed and random effects estimators using Hausman tests
and found little practical difference between those estimates, although the tests all rejected the assumption of unbiasedness for
the random effects approach. This is likely to be due to our large sample, where within effects swamp between effects and the
Hausman test is over-powered. Results are available on request.
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Figure 3: Multidimensional performance estimates
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Table 3: Number of dominant/dominated providers under different estimation approaches and
assumptions about the correlation between performance dimensions
Probability
threshold Pr∗
(1) Univariate
(2) Intermediate
multivariate (3) Full multivariate
Dominant Dominated Dominant Dominated Dominant Dominated
0.50 5 8 7 10 24 30
0.80 2 3 5 5 12 18
0.90 1 1 2 2 5 8
0.99 0 0 0 1 1 1
(1) Univariate approach - separate univariate models are estimated for each of the four performance dimensions
and providers are considered dominant [dominated] if the independent probability of being dominant [dominated]
exceeds 1− (1− Pr∗)/4 on each of the four dimensions.
(2) Intermediate multivariate approach - multivariate model is estimated and providers are considered dominant
[dominated] if the independent probability of being dominant [dominated] exceeds 1− (1− Pr∗)/4 on each
of the four dimensions. Correlation between performance dimensions is exploited in the estimation stage but
ignored when forming probability statements.
(3) Fully multivariate approach - multivariate model is estimated and providers are considered dominant
[dominated] if the probability of being dominant [dominated] on all four dimensions jointly exceeds Pr∗. See
section 3.2 for details.
would compare dominant ISTCs and dominated NHS hospitals across a range of characteristics (e.g.
staffing ratios, experience of surgical teams, profit margin, etc.) to generate hypotheses about the likely
causal factors underlying those performance differences. Unfortunately, data limitations, especially with
respect to ISTCs, prevent us from doing so.
5.4. Comparison with approaches based on series of univariate probabilities
It is instructive to compare the results from our MVMLM assessment with two alternative approaches: 1)
a series of four univariate multilevel regressions, and 2) an ‘intermediate’ MVMLM regression that takes
into account the correlation between achievements during the estimation stage but treats performance
estimates as independent. In both cases a provider is judged to be dominant [dominated] if all four
individual probabilities of exceeding [falling short of] the benchmarks are greater or equal to a specified
probability threshold (‘confidence box approach’). The second approach can thus be seen as an
intermediate between a simple univariate approach and the full multivariate approach employed in this
study.
The univariate and intermediate multivariate approach both involve comparing four independent probab-
ilities against a threshold value, which would lead to inflated risk of classifying providers as dominant
[or dominated] when they are not (type I error). We adopt here the Bonferroni correction to adjust for
multiple comparisons, i.e. we require (1-(1-Pr∗)/4)*100% probability on each of the four dimensions to
designate a provider as dominant/dominated, where Pr∗ equals the desired level of certainty.
Table 3 shows the number of provider identified as dominant/dominated under each of these approaches.
At a probability threshold of 90% (Pr∗=0.9), the univariate and intermediate multivariate both identify just
one or two dominant and dominated providers, which is fewer than the full MVMLM. The intermediate
multivariate approach is more efficient than the univariate approach. This becomes apparent when
applying an 80% threshold. At this probability threshold the univariate assessments identify two dominant
and three dominated providers, whereas the intermediate MVMLM identifies five dominant and five
dominated providers. The full MVMLM approach identifies 12 dominant and 18 dominated providers at
the 80% threshold.
Multidimensional performance assessment using dominance criteria 19
6. Discussion
Rarely are stakeholders explicit about the valuations they attach to different dimensions of performance,
nor are these valuations likely to be identical. This renders the construction of a composite performance
indicator that is appropriate for all audiences unfeasible. To circumvent this, we have set out a methodo-
logy for comparing healthcare providers in terms of their performance across a range of dimensions in a
way that does not require valuation of each dimension and is consistent with economic theory. Building on
previous literature, we analyse relative provider performance for each dimension and allow for correlation
across dimensions (e.g. Hauck and Street 2006; Martin and Smith 2005; Hall and Hamilton 2004). We
extend this literature by employing dominance criteria to compare providers against a multidimensional
benchmark, and by constructing multivariate (rather than univariate) hypothesis tests of parameters that
account for correlation between dimensions and thereby achieve correct coverage probabilities. Failure
to perform multivariate tests can lead to incorrect inferences about multidimensional performance as we
illustrate.
We have applied our MVMLM approach to study the performance of English providers of care to patients
having hip replacement. By focusing on a single procedure, we can draw more robust conclusions
about performance than studies conducted at hospital level. Our use of patient-level data allows us
to employ multilevel models to control for a diverse range of patient characteristics and, thereby, to
isolate the provider’s impact on observed achievements. We study four dimensions of performance,
namely long waiting times (>18 weeks), length of stay, 28-day readmission rates, and patient-reported
health status after surgery. Achievements on some of these dimensions are correlated, implying that
our multivariate estimation framework is appropriate. Our results do not suggest trade-offs between
achievements on the four performance dimensions we studied. Instead, we observe positive, albeit weak,
correlations. We wish to stress that these results do not necessarily imply a causal relationship between
achievements, although some of our findings confirm those of randomised controlled trials conducted in
routine care settings.15 Nevertheless, this suggests that pairs of achievements are either a) driven by
common underlying factors that enter both production functions, such as organisational effort, or b) that
achievements on one dimension enable achievements on another. This information is of interest itself
as it informs the debate whether incentive schemes can be simplified to reward providers on a subset
of correlated measures, as suggested by Glazer et al. (2008), or whether regulators should instead
ascertain performance across all individual performance dimensions of interest.
Our estimation yields, for each provider, one performance estimate per performance dimension, which
together form a provider’s performance profile. To translate this profile into a single statement about
performance we employ a set of dominance criteria and classify providers into three groups: (i) dominant
providers, which are ‘positive deviants’ that exhibit outstanding performance across all performance
dimensions; (ii) dominated providers, which are ‘negative deviants’ with sub-standard performance; and
(iii) the remainder. In this study of patients having hip replacement, all dominant providers were found
to be privately operated treatment centres specialising in elective (i.e. non-emergency) hip and knee
replacement, while all dominated providers were public NHS providers providing a wide range of services.
ISTCs have previously been found to achieve on average better health outcomes than public providers
(Browne et al. 2008; Chard et al. 2011) and to discharge patients earlier (Siciliani et al. 2013), and we
can confirm these findings in our data. This may be the result of a more stream-lined production process:
ISTCs typically focus exclusively on elective orthopaedic procedures, such as hip and knee replacement,
whereas NHS providers offer a wide range of service, including emergency care. If the organisational
15 Importantly, these trials also provide evidence on the direction of the causal effect, i.e. what causes what.
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set-up of ISTCs allows them to specialise almost exclusively on treating particular types of patient, this
may result in performance advantages. Our data do not allow us to unpack the reasons for the observed
performance further, and we stress that performance assessment results should form the starting point
for further investigations involving site visits and qualitative analysis (Bradley et al. 2009). As with most
regression analyses, general differences between types of providers can be identified using conditional
mean comparisons, in which indicator variables are used to specify provider types. But our approach
also allows us to identify positive and negative deviants within these broad categories. This is important
as otherwise regulatory efforts may be accidently directed at those ISTCs that are found to perform
relatively poorly.
The appeal of the dominance approach lies in the absence of strong assumptions about the various
stakeholders’ utility functions and its ability to reduce multiple performance estimates into a single
assessment. However, this comes at a price. Because the approach requires providers to perform
better than the benchmark on all dimensions, there is no scope to compensate for average or poor
performance on one dimension through excellent performance on another. This very strict yardstick
is difficult to achieve and so we identify only a small number of providers as dominant or dominated.
Also, as the number of objectives under consideration increases it becomes increasingly more difficult to
satisfy the dominance criteria (Pedraja-Chaparro et al. 1999). Nevertheless, although we have illustrated
our methodology by analysing only four dimensions, it is generalisable to multiple dimensions.
These qualifications not withstanding, we advocate the dominance approach to multidimensional per-
formance assessment as a useful addition to regulators’ toolboxes.
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Table A1: Estimated coefficients and standard errors from multivariate regression model
Length of stay Post-operative OHS Waiting time > 18 weeks
28-day emergency
readmission
Variable Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE
Constant 2.078 0.052*** 27.154 0.823*** -1.335 0.053*** -1.609 0.119***
FY 2010/11 -0.096 0.011*** 0.043 0.072 0.114 0.045* -0.008 0.019
FY 2011/12 -0.203 0.015*** 0.229 0.085** 0.208 0.050*** -0.051 0.020*
Pre-operative OHS -0.011 0.001*** 0.599 0.016*** -0.005 0.001***
Pre-operative OHS2 0.000 0.000*** -0.009 0.000***
Patient age -0.027 0.002*** 0.208 0.025*** -0.014 0.004***
Patient age2 0.000 0.000*** -0.002 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
Male patient -0.074 0.004*** 0.908 0.062*** 0.142 0.015***
Primary diagnosis: Rheumatoid arthritis 0.026 0.022 -0.486 0.529 -0.086 0.113
Primary diagnosis: Other 0.035 0.009*** -1.169 0.187*** 0.079 0.028**
Elixhauser comorbidities: 1 0.025 0.004*** -0.456 0.068*** 0.061 0.017***
Elixhauser comorbidities: 2-3 0.068 0.004*** -1.433 0.083*** 0.148 0.017***
Elixhauser comorbidities: 4+ 0.153 0.007*** -2.826 0.133*** 0.285 0.023***
Previously admitted as an emergency 0.071 0.005*** -0.613 0.124*** 0.137 0.023***
Socio-economic status 0.003 0.001** -0.523 0.027*** 0.011 0.005*
Disabled -0.036 0.003*** 2.586 0.080*** -0.065 0.016***
Living alone 0.111 0.005*** -0.368 0.071***
Symptom duration: 1 - 5 years 0.020 0.004*** -0.654 0.077***
Symptom duration: 6 - 10 years 0.039 0.005*** -1.335 0.121***
Symptom duration: > 10 years 0.055 0.007*** -1.712 0.159***
Assistance in filling in PROM questionnaire 0.067 0.005*** -0.545 0.097***
HRG: HB11C - category 1 without CC 0.037 0.006***
HRG: HB12B - category 2 with CC 0.127 0.006***
HRG: HB12A - category 2 with major CC 0.495 0.011***
HRG: HB11B - category 1 with CC 0.122 0.016***
HRG: other 0.376 0.031***
First-stage residual 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.006* 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001*
Var(θj ) 0.025 0.002*** 1.203 0.141*** 0.378 0.038*** 0.023 0.003***
Var(ǫij ) 0.162 0.001*** 68.563 0.340*** 1.000 1.000
Number of observations 95,955
*** p< 0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Legend: Est = Estimate; SE = Huber-White standard error (robust to unknown heteroscedasticity); OHS = Oxford Hip Score; HRG = Healthcare Resource Group; CC = Complications and comorbidities; FY = Financial year (April - March).
Socio-economic status is approximated by the % of neighbourhood residents claiming income benefits. This characteristics is measured at neighbourhood level (lower super output area (LSOA)).
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Table A2: Estimated coefficients and stand-
ard errors - multinomial hospital choice
model (first-stage)
Variable Est SE
Closest hospital 0.185 0.014***
Distance to hospital -0.197 0.003***
Distance2 0.001 0.0001***
Distance3 -0.00002 0.000002***
Number of patients 95,955
Number of providers 252
Pseudo R2 0.706
χ2(4) 120,930
*** p< 0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Legend: Est = Estimate; SE = Huber-White standard er-
ror
Notes: Distance to hospital is measured as the straight-
line distance from the centroid of the patient’s lower super
output area (LSOA) to the provider’s headquarter (NHS
trust) or hospital site (ISTCs). Distance is measured in
kilometres.
Table A3: Correlation between performance dimensions - ex-
cluding ISTCs
Performance dimension (1) (2) (3) (4)
Length of stay (1) 1.00 -0.13 0.02 0.02
Post-operative OHS (2) -0.27 1.00 -0.02 -0.07
Waiting time > 18 wks (3) 0.11 -0.02 1.00 0.00
28-day emergency readmission (4) -0.03 -0.46 -0.02 1.00
Notes: Lower triangle reports the correlation between random effects at provider
level, whereas upper triangle (in italics) reports the correlation between random ef-
fects (i.e. the idiosyncratic error term) at patient level. Bold indicates that the correl-
ation is statistically significantly different from zero at the 95% level.
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Table A4: Correlation between performance dimensions - ac-
counting for provider average risk factors
Performance dimension (1) (2) (3) (4)
Length of stay (1) 1.00 -0.13 0.02 0.02
Post-operative OHS (2) -0.21 1.00 -0.02 -0.07
Waiting time > 18 wks (3) 0.19 -0.17 1.00 0.00
28-day emergency readmission (4) -0.08 -0.35 0.07 1.00
Notes: Lower triangle reports the correlation between random effects at provider
level, whereas upper triangle (in italics) reports the correlation between random ef-
fects (i.e. the idiosyncratic error term) at patient level. Bold indicates that the correl-
ation is statistically significantly different from zero at the 95% level.
Table A5: Correlation between performance dimensions - risk-
adjustment based on HES data only
Performance dimension (1) (2) (3) (4)
Length of stay (1) 1.00 -0.16 0.01 0.02
Post-operative OHS (2) -0.41 1.00 -0.01 -0.07
Waiting time > 18 wks (3) 0.28 -0.37 1.00 0.00
28-day emergency readmission (4) 0.04 -0.47 0.17 1.00
Notes: Lower triangle reports the correlation between random effects at provider
level, whereas upper triangle (in italics) reports the correlation between random
effects (i.e. the idiosyncratic error term) at patient level. Bold indicates that the
correlation is statistically significantly different from zero at the 95% level.
